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Abstract
Moderate Density Parity Check (MDPC) codes are defined here as codes which have a
parity-check matrix whose row weight is O(
√
n) where n is the length n of the code. They
can be decoded like LDPC codes but they decode much less errors than LDPC codes: the
number of errors they can decode in this case is of order Ω(
√
n). Despite this fact they have
been proved very useful in cryptography for devising key exchange mechanisms. They have
also been proposed in McEliece type cryptosystems. However in this case, the parameters
that have been proposed in [MTSB13] were broken in [GJS16]. This attack exploits the
fact that the decoding failure probability is non-negligible. We show here that this attack
can be thwarted by choosing the parameters in a more conservative way. We first show
that such codes can decode with a simple bit-flipping decoder any pattern of O
(√
n log log n
log n
)
errors. This avoids the previous attack at the cost of significantly increasing the key size of
the scheme. We then show that under a very reasonable assumption the decoding failure
probability decays almost exponentially with the codelength with just two iterations of bit-
flipping. With an additional assumption it has even been proved that it decays exponentially
with an unbounded number of iterations and we show that in this case the increase of the
key size which is required for resisting to the attack of [GJS16] is only moderate.
1 Introduction
Virtually all the public key cryptography used in practice today can be attacked in polynomial
time by a quantum computer [Sho94]. Even if such a quantum computer does not exist yet,
finding viable solutions which would be resistant to a quantum computer is expected to be a
lengthy process. This is one of the reasons why the NIST has recently launched a process for
standardizing public key cryptographic algorithms that would be safe against a quantum adver-
sary. Code-based cryptography is believed to be quantum resistant and is therefore considered as
a viable solution. The McEliece system [McE78] based on binary Goppa codes, which is almost
as old as RSA, is a public key cryptosystem that falls into this category. It has withstood all
cryptanalyses up to now. It is well known to provide extremely fast encryption and fast decryp-
tion [BS08, BCS13], but has large public keys, about 200 kilobytes for 128 bits of security and
slightly less than one megabyte for 256 bits of security [BLP08].
There have been many attempts to decrease the key size of this system. One of the most
satisfying answer up to now has been to use Moderate Density Parity Check (MDPC) codes.
The rows of their parity-check that defines them is of order O (
√
n) when n is the length of the
code. This family is very attractive since (i) the decryption algorithm is extremely simple and
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is based on a very simple bit flipping decoding algorithm, (ii) direct attacks on the key really
amount to a problem of the same nature as decoding a linear code. This can be used to give a
security proof [MTSB13].
This work builds upon the following observation: decoding w errors in a generic linear code
C or finding a codeword of weight w in the linear code where this word has been added to C are
problems that are polynomially equivalent. This problem is considered very hard when t or w
are large enough: after decades of active research [Pra62, LB88, Leo88, Ste88, Dum91, Bar97,
FS09, BLP11, MMT11, BJMM12, MO15, DT17, BM17] the best algorithms solving this issue
are still exponential in t (or w), their complexity is of the form e
tα(R)(1+o(1))
N (replace t by w in the
low-weight search problem) where N is the number of solutions of the problem and R is the rate
of the code. This holds even for algorithms in the quantum computing model [Ber11, KT17].
Moreover, the relative exponent α(R) has decreased only very slowly after 50 years of active
research on the topic.The proposal made in [MTSB13] exploits this. It suggests to use MDPC
codes of rate 12 of a certain length n in a McEliece scheme which are able to decode t = Θ(
√
n)
errors with parity-check equations of weight w ≈ t. Recovering the plaintext without knowing
the secret parity-check matrix of the code amounts to decode Θ(
√
n) errors in a linear code
which is conjectured to be hard [Ale11], whereas recovering the secret MDPC structure amounts
to find codewords of roughly the same weight as t in the dual code that has the same dimension
as the code that is decoded. Both problems are equally hard here. Note that this is not the case
if we would have taken LDPC codes. They can decode much larger errors, however in this case
finding the low weight parity-checks can be done in polynomial time which breaks the system
completely as observed in [MRAS00].
However there is a problem with the security proof of [MTSB13] because it does not take into
account the decoding failure probability. This is not not necessarily a problem in a setting where
the scheme is used to devise ephemeral keys [BGG+17, ABB+17]. However, in security models
where an attacker is allowed to query the decryption oracle many times, this can be a problem as
observed by [GJS16] which showed how to attack the parameters proposed in [MTSB13]. This
attack really exploits the non negligible decoding failure probability of the MDPC codes chosen
in [MTSB13]. If this probability were as low as 2−λ where 2λ is the complexity of the best
attack that the scheme has to sustain, then this would not be a problem and the security proof
of [BGG+17] could be used to show the security of the scheme under this stronger attacking
model. This raises the issue whether or not the error probability of MDPC codes can be made
extremely small for affordable parameters.
We tackle this issue by giving several different answers to this issue. We study in depth
this question in the regime which is particularly interesting for these cryptographic applications,
namely when the weight of the parity-check equations is of order O (
√
n) where n is the length
of the MDPC code. We define in the whole article MDPC codes in this way
Definition 1 (MDPC code). An MDPC code is a binary linear code that admits a parity check
matrix whose rows are all of weight O (
√
n) where n is the length of the code. In the case where
this parity-check matrix has rows of a same weight w and columns of a same weight v, we say
that the parity-check matrix is of type (v, w). By some abuse of terminology, we will also call the
corresponding code a code of type (v, w).
We will decode these codes with an even simpler bit-flipping decoding algorithm than the one
considered in [MTSB13] to simplify the analysis. One round of decoding is just majority-logic
decoding based on a sparse parity-check matrix of the code. When we perform just one round of
bit-flipping we call this decoder a majority-logic decoder. Recall that a majority logic decoder
based on a certain parity-check matrix computes for all bits the number ui of parity-checks that
involve the bit i that are are unsatisfied. Let ni be the number of parity-checks involving bit i.
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If for a bit i we have ui > ni/2 (i.e if a strict majority of such parity-checks is violated) the bit
gets flipped. The parity-check equations used for making the decision on a given bit may depend
on the bit (in particular they may have disjoint supports outside the bit they help to decode).
This is not the path we follow here. It turns out that for an MDPC code, we can use all the
parity-check equations defining the MDPC code without too much penalty in doing so. We will
assume here that the computation of the vi’s is done in parallel so that flipping one bit does not
affect the other vj ’s. In other words the decoder works as given in Algorithm 1 when we perform
N iterations.
Algorithm 1 Bit-flipping decoder
Input: y ∈ {0, 1}n the word that has to be decoded
Output: the decoded word.
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} do
ni ← # {j ∈ {1, . . . , r} : hji = 1}
for a = 1 to N do
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} do
ui ← # {j ∈ {1, . . . , r} : hji = 1,
⊕
ℓ hjℓyℓ = 1}
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} do
if ui > ni/2 then
yi ← 1− yi
return y
A crucial quantity will play an important role, namely
Definition 2 (maximum column intersection). Let H = (hij)1≤i≤r
1≤j≤n
be a binary matrix. The
intersection number of two different columns j and j′ of H is equal to the number of rows i
for which hij = hij′ = 1. The maximum column intersection of H is equal to the maximum
intersection number of two different columns of H.
The point is that it is readily verified (see Proposition 1) that an MDPC code of type (v, w)
corrects all errors of weight ≤ ⌊ v2s⌋ by majority-logic decoding (i.e. Algorithm 1 with N = 1)
when the maximum column intersection is s. What makes this result interesting is that for
most MDPC codes the maximum column intersection is really small. We namely prove that
for a natural random MDPC code model, the maximum column intersection of the parity-check
matrix defining the MDPC code is typically of order Ω
(
logn
log logn
)
. Computing the maximum
intersection number can obviously be performed in polynomial time and this allows us to give a
randomized polynomial time algorithm for constructing MDPC codes of length n and fixed rate
R ∈ (0, 1) that corrects any pattern of Ω
(√
n log logn
log n
)
errors with the majority-logic decoder.
Moreover, under a reasonable assumption on the first round of the bit-flipping decoder, the
same MDPC codes correct Ω (
√
n) errors with two iterations of a bit-flipping decoder with de-
coding failure probability of order e−Ω(
n log logn
logn ). It should be noted that under an additional as-
sumption on the subsequent iterations of the bit-flipping decoder, it has been proved in [ABB+17]
that MDPC codes correct Ω (
√
n) errors by performing an unbounded number of bit-flipping it-
erations with probability of error e−Ω(n). We also provide some concrete numbers to show that
it is possible to construct MDPC codes that avoid completely the attack [GJS16] and for which
it is possible to provide a security proof in strong security models with a significant key size
overhead when compared to the parameters proposed in [MTSB13] if we want to stay in the
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no-error scenario, with a reasonable overhead if we make the first assumption mentioned above,
and moderate overhead if we make both assumptions mentioned above.
2 Majority-logic decoding and its performance for MDPC
codes
We start this section by relating the error-correction capacity of an MDPC code to the maximum
column intersection of its defining parity-check matrix, then show that for typical MDPC codes
the intersection number is small and that this allows to construct efficiently MDPC codes that
correct all patterns of O
(√
n log log n
log n
)
errors.
2.1 Error correction capacity of an MDPC code vs. maximum column
intersection
As explained in the introduction the maximum column intersection can be used to lower bound
the worst-case error-correction perfomance for the majority-logic decoder (Algorithm 1 with
N = 1). The precise statement is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Consider a code with a parity check matrix for which every column has weight at
least v and whose maximum column intersection is s. Performing majority-logic decoding based
on this matrix (i.e. Algorithm 1 with N = 1) corrects all errors of weight ≤ ⌊ v2s⌋.
Proof. We denote by H = (hij)1≤i≤r
1≤j≤n
the parity-check matrix we use for performing majority-
logic decoding and by t the number of errors. We assume that t ≤ ⌊ v2s⌋. For i in {1, . . . , r}
denote by Ei the subset of positions ℓ which are in error and in the support of the i-th parity
check equation (i.e. hiℓ = 1). We number the parity-check equations of the code from 1 to r.
We consider now what happens to yj in the algorithm. There are two cases to consider.
Case 1: yj is erroneous. We can upper-bound the number sj of satisfied parity-check equations
involving this bit by the number of parity-check equations involving this bit whose support
contains at least 2 errors. We consider now the graph Gj which is a bipartite graph associated
to j which is constructed as follows. Its set of vertices is the union of the set Aj of positions
different from j which are in error and the set Bj of parity-check equations that involve the
position j and whose support contains at least 2 errors. There is an edge between a position ℓ in
Aj and parity-check equation i in Bj if and only if the parity-check equation involves ℓ, that is
hiℓ = 1. Let ej be the number of edges of Gj and let nj be the number of parity-check equations
involving j. We observe now that
sj ≤ # {i : hij = 1, |Ei| ≥ 2} (1)
≤ ej
≤ s#Aj (2)
≤ s(t− 1)
≤ s
(⌊ v
2s
⌋
− 1
)
< v/2.
(1) is just the first observation whereas (2) follows from the fact the degree in Gj of any vertex
is at most s by the assumption on the maximum intersection number of H. Since v/2 ≤ nj/2
4
it follows that the majority-logic decoder necessarily flips the bit and therefore corrects the
corresponding error.
Case 2: there is no error in position j. We can upper-bound the number uj of unsatisfied
positions in a similar way. This time we consider the graph G′j whose vertex set is the union
of A′j which is the set of positions which are in error and B
′
j the set of parity-check equations
involving j and whose support contains this time at least one error. We put an edge between
a position ℓ in A′j and parity-check equation i in B
′
j if and only if the parity-check equation
involves ℓ. Let e′j be the number of edges of G
′
j . Similarly to what we did we observe now that
uj ≤ # {i : hij = 1, |Ei| ≥ 1}
≤ e′j
≤ s#A′j
≤ st
≤ s
(⌊ v
2s
⌋)
(3)
≤ v/2
≤ nj/2.
In other words we will not flip this bit.
2.2 A random model for MDPC codes of type (v, w)
There are several ways to build random MDPC codes of type (v, w). The one which is used
in cryptography [BBC08, MTSB13, DGZ17, BGG+17, ABB+17, BBC+17] is to construct them
as quasi-cyclic codes. Our proof technique can also be applied to this case, but since there are
several different types of construction of this kind, so that we have to adapt our proof technique to
each of those, we will consider a more general model here. It is based on Gallager’s construction
of LDPC codes [Gal63]. We will construct an r × n random parity-check matrix of type (v, w)
by assuming that n is a multiple of w (n = n′w), r is a multiple of v (r = r′v) and that rw = nv
(this condition is necessary in order to obtain a matrix of type (v, w)). Let Pn,w be a matrix of
size n′ × n constructed as follows
Pn,w = In′ ⊗ 1w =


1w 0w . . . . . . 0w
0w 1w 0w · · · 0w
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
... . . .
. . .
. . . 0w
0w . . . . . . 0w 1w

 .
where In′ denotes the identity matrix of size n
′, 1w a row vector of length w whose entries are
all equal to 1, that is 1w = (1 . . . 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
w times
, 0w a row vector of length w whose entries are all equal to
0. We then choose v permutations of length n at random and they define a parity-check matrix
H(π1, . . . , πv) of size r × n of type (v, w) as
H(π1, . . . , πv) =


Pπ1n,w
Pπ2n,w
. . .
Pπvn,w

 ,
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where Pπin,w denotes the matrix Pn,w whose columns have been permuted with πi. We denote by
Dr,n,v,w the associated probability distribution of binary matrices of size r × n and type (v, w)
we obtain when the πi’s are chosen uniformly at random.
2.3 The maximum intersection number of matrices drawn according
to Dr,n,v,w
The maximum intersection number of matrices drawn according to Dr,n,v,w turns out to be
remarkably small when w and v are of order
√
n, it is namely typically of order O
(
logn
log logn
)
. To
prove this claim we first observe that
Lemma 1. Consider a matrix H drawn at random according to the distribution Dr,n,v,w. Take
two arbitrary columns j and j′ of H and let njj′ be the intersection number of j and j′. We have
for all t ∈ {0, . . . , v}
P(njj′ = t) =
(
v
t
)(
w − 1
n− 1
)t(
1− w − 1
n− 1
)v−t
.
Proof. Recall that H = (hij)1≤i≤r
1≤j≤n
is of the form
H(π1, . . . , πv) =


Pπ1n,w
Pπ2n,w
. . .
Pπvn,w

 ,
for some permutations π1, π2, . . . , πv chosen uniformly at random in Sn. A row i of H is called
a coincidence if and only if hij = hij′ . There is obviously one coincidence at most in each of the
blocks Pπℓn,w. We claim now that the probability of a coincidence in each of these blocks is
w−1
n−1 .
To verify this consider the row i of block Pπℓn,w which is such that hij = 1. The probability that
there is a coincidence for this block is the probability that hij′ = 1 which amounts to the fact
that πℓ(j
′) takes its values in a subset of w − 1 values among n− 1 possible values. All of these
n − 1 are equiprobable. This shows the claim. Since the coincidences that occur in the blocks
are all independent (since the πi’s are independent) we obtain the aforementioned formula.
We use this to prove the following result
Proposition 2. Let α and β be two constants such that 0 < α < β. Assume we draw a parity-
check matrix H at random according to the distribution Dr,n,v,w where we assume that both v
and w satisfy α
√
n ≤ v < w ≤ β√n. Then for any ε > 0 the maximum intersection number of
H is smaller than (2 + ε) lnnln log n with probability 1− o(1) as n tends to infinity.
Proof. Let is number the columns of H from 1 to n. For i and j in {1, . . . , n} two different
columns of H we denote by Ei,j,t the event that the intersection number of i and j is ≥ t. Let
Et be the probability that the maximum intersection number is larger than or equal to t. By
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the union bound, and then Lemma 1 we obtain
P(Et) = P

 ⋃
1≤i<j≤n
Ei,j,t


≤
∑
1≤i<j≤n
P(Ei,j,t)
≤ n2
v∑
s=t
(
v
s
)(
w − 1
n− 1
)s(
1− w − 1
n− 1
)v−s
From this we deduce
P(Et) ≤ n2
v∑
s=t
vv
ss(v − s)v−s
(
w − 1
n− 1
)s(
1− w − 1
n− 1
)v−s
where we use the well known upper-bound
(
v
s
) ≤ evh(s/v) = vvss(v−s)v−s . This allows to write
P(Et) ≤ n2
v∑
s=t
vv
ss(v − s)v−s
(w
n
)s
(4)
≤ n2
v∑
s=t
vv−s
(v − s)v−s
(v · w
s · n
)s
≤ n2
v∑
s=t
(
1 +
s
v − s
)v−s (v · w
s · n
)s
≤ n2
v∑
s=t
(e · v · w
s · n
)s
≤ n2
v∑
s=t
(
eβ2
s
)s
Choose now t ≥ (2 + ε) lnnln lnn for some ε > 0. When n is large enough, we have that eβ
2
t < 1. In
such a case we can write
P(Et) ≤ n2
v∑
s=t
(
eβ2
t
)s
≤
n2
(
eβ2
t
)t
1− eβ2t
≤ n2
(
K
t
)t
for some constant K > 0. This implies that
P(Et) ≤ n2e(2+ε)
lnn
ln lnn ln(
K ln lnn
γ lnn )
≤ eε lnn+
γ lnn ln(K ln lnnγ )
ln lnn
= o(1)
as n tends to infinity.
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This together with Proposition 1 implies directly the following corollary
Corollary 1. There exists a randomized algorithm working in expected polynomial time out-
putting for any designed rate R ∈ (0, 1) an MDPC code of rate ≥ R of an arbitrarily large length
n and parity-check equations of weight Θ(
√
n) that corrects all patterns of errors of size less than
γ
√
n ln lnn
lnn for n large enough, where γ > 0 is some absolute constant.
Proof. The randomized algorithm is very simple. We choose n to be a square n = w2 for some
integer w and let v
def
= ⌊(1−R)w⌋ and r def= nvw . Then we draw a parity-check matrix H at
random according to the distribution Dr,n,v,w. The corresponding code has clearly rate ≥ R.
We compute the maximum column intersection of H. This can be done in time O
(
wn2
)
. If this
column intersection is greater than (2+ ε) lnnln lnn we output the corresponding MDPC code, if not
we draw at random H again until finding a suitable matrix H. By Proposition 1 we know that
such a code can correct all patterns of at most
⌊
α
√
n ln lnn
(4+2ε) lnn
⌋
errors. This implies the corollary.
3 Analysis of two iterations of bit-flipping
We derived in the previous section a condition ensuring that one round of bit-flipping corrects
all the errors. We will now estimate the probability that performing one round of bit-flipping
corrects enough errors so that another round of bit-flipping will correct all remaining errors.
To analyze the first round of decoding we will model intermediate quantities of the bit-flipping
algorithm by binomial distributions. More precisely, consider an MDPC code of type (v, w) and
length n. The noise model is the following: an error of weight t was chosen uniformly at random
and added to the codeword of the MDPC code. For i ∈ {1, . . . , n− t}, let E0i be the Bernouilli
random variable which is equal to 1 iff the i-th position that was not in error initially is in error
after the first round of iterative decoding. We also denote by U0i the counter uj associated to the
i-th position which was not in error. U0i is the sum
∑v
j=1 V
0
ij of v Bernouilli random variables
V 0ij associated to the v parity-check equations involving this bit. A Bernoulli-random variable
V 0ij is equal to 1 if and only the corresponding parity-check is equal to 1. Note that by definition
of the bit-flipping decoder
E0i = 1{U0i >v/2}
Similarly, for i ∈ {1, . . . , t} we denote by E1i the Bernoulli random variable that is equal to 1 iff
the i-th bit that was in error initially stays in error after the first round of Algorithm 1. We also
define the U1i ’s and the V
1
ij ’s similarly. In this case
E1i = 1{U1i ≤v/2}.
Let us bring in for b ∈ {0, 1}:
pb
def
= P(V bij = 1). (5)
It is clear that these probabilities do not depend on i and j and that this definition is consistent.
It is (essentially) proved in [ABB+17] that
Lemma 2. Assume that w = O (
√
n) and t = O (
√
n). Then
pb =
1
2
− (−1)bε
(
1
2
+O
(
1√
n
))
, (6)
where ε
def
= e−
2wt
n .
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We will recall a proof of this statement in the appendix. We will now make the following
assumption that simplifies the analysis
Assumption 1. When we use Algorithm 1 on an MDPC code of type (v, w), we assume that
• for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n − t} the counters U0i of Algorithm 1 are distributed like sums of v
independent Bernoulli random variables of parameter p0 at the first iteration and the E
0
i ’s
are independent;
• for all i ∈ {1, . . . , t} the counters U1i of Algorithm 1 are distributed like sums of v inde-
pendent Bernoulli random variables of parameter p1 at the first iteration and the E
1
i ’s are
independent.
The experiments performed in [Cha17] corroborate this assumption for the first iteration of
the bit-flipping decoder. To analyze the behavior of Algorithm 1 we will use the following lemma
which is just a slight generalization of Lemma 6 in [ABB+17]
Lemma 3. Under Assumption 1 used for an MDPC code of type (v, w) and when the error is
chosen uniformly at random among the errors of weight t, we have for all (b, i) ∈ {0}×{1, . . . , n−
t} ∪ {1} × {1, . . . , t},
P(Ebi = 1) = O
(
(1 − ε2)v/2√
vε
)
,
where ε
def
= e−
2wt
n .
For the ease of reading the proof of this lemma is also recalled in the appendix. Under
Assumption 1, P(Ebi = 1) does not depend on i, we will denote it by
qb
def
= P(Ebi = 1).
We let
S0
def
= E01 + · · ·+ E0n−t
S1
def
= E11 + · · ·+ E1t
S0 is the number of errors that were introduced after one round of iterative decoding coming from
flipping the n − t bits that were initially correct. Similarly S1 is the number of errors that are
left after one round of iterative decoding coming from not flipping the t bits that were initially
incorrect. Let S
def
= S0 + S1, which represents the total number of errors that are left after the
first round of iterative decoding. We quantify the probability that this quantity does not decay
enough by the following theorem which holds under Assumption 1.
Theorem 1. Under Assumption 1, we have for an MDPC code of type (v, w) where v = Θ(
√
n)
and w = Θ(
√
n):
P(S ≥ t′) ≤ 1√
t′
e
t′v
4 ln(1−ε2)+ t
′
8 ln(n)+O(t
′ ln(t′/t)),
where ε
def
= e−
2wt
n .
From this theorem we deduce that
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Corollary 2. Provided that Assumption 1 holds, we can construct in expected polynomial time
for any designed rate R ∈ (0, 1) an MDPC code of rate ≥ R of an arbitrarily large length n and
parity-check equations of weight Θ(
√
n) where the probability of error Pe after two iterations of
bit-flipping is upper-bounded by e−Ω(n
ln lnn
lnn ) when there are t = Θ(
√
n) errors.
Proof. We use the construction given in the proof of Corollary 1 to construct an MDPC code
of type (v, w) of length n = w2 and with v
def
= ⌊(1−R)w⌋ that allows to correct all patterns of
errors of size less than γ
√
n ln lnn
lnn for n large enough, where γ > 0 is some absolute constant with
just one round of the bit-flipping decoder of Algorithm 1. Then we use Theorem 1 to show that
with probability upper-bounded by e−Ω(n
ln lnn
lnn ) there remains at most γ
√
n ln lnn
lnn errors after one
round of Algorithm 1. This proves the corollary.
In [ABB+17] there is an additional assumption which is made which is that the probability
of error is dominated by the probability that the first round of decoding is not able to decrease
the number by some mutiplicative factor α. With the notation of this section, this assumption
can be described as follows.
Assumption 2. There exists some constant α > 0 such that the probability of error Perr for an
unbounded number of iterations of Algorithm 1 is upper-bounded by P(S ≥ αt) where S is the
number of errors that are left after the first round of Algorithm 1 and t is the initial number of
errors.
This assumption also agrees with the experiments performed in [Cha17]. With this additional
assumption (Assumption 1 is actually also made) it is proven in [ABB+17] that the probability of
errors decays exponentially when t = Θ(
√
n). This is actually obtained by a slightly less general
version of Theorem 1 (see [ABB+17, Theorem 1]).
4 Numerical results
In this section we provide numerical results showing how much we have to increase the parameters
proposed in [MTSB13] in order to obtain a probability of error which is below 2−λ where λ is
the security parameter (i.e. 2λ should be the complexity of the best attacks on the scheme).
The upper-bound on the probability that the maximum column intersection is larger than some
bound coming from using Lemma 1 together with an obvious union-bound is a little bit loose,
and we performed numerical tests in order to estimate the maximum column intersection. To
speed-up the calculation and at the same time to be closer to the cryptographic applications
we considered the particular code structure used in [MTSB13, BGG+17, ABB+17], namely a
quasi-cyclic code whose parity-chack matrix H is formed by two circulant blocks H0 and H1,
i.e. H =
(
H0 H1
)
. The weight of the rows of H0 and H1 was chosen to be w/2 (with w even)
so that we have a code of type (w/2, w). The maximum column intersection s given in Table
1 corresponds to the smallest number s0 such that more than 20% of the parity-check matrices
had a maximum column intersection ≤ s0. We considered several scenarios:
- Scenario I, Algorithm 1 with N = 1 and a zero-error decoding failure Perr probability when
there are t errors;
- Scenario II: Algorithm 1 with N = 2 and a non-zero decoding failure probability upper-bounded
by making Assumption 1 when there are t errors,
- Scenario III, Algorithm 1 with N > 2 and a non-zero decoding failure probability when there
are t errors which is upper-bounded by making Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 for α = 0.5;
- Scenario IV, Algorithm 1 with N > 2 and a non-zero decoding failure probability when there
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are t errors which is upper-bounded by making Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 for α = 0.75.
This should be compared with the original parameters proposed for a security level λ = 80 in
[MTSB13] that were broken in [GJS16], namely n = 9602, w = 90, t = 84. We have chosen
t = 84 in all cases.
Table 1: Numerical results
Scenario n w s Perr
I 4100014 4034 12 0
II 35078 110 9 2−80
III 20854 90 3 2−80
IV 18982 90 3 2−80
5 Concluding remarks
This study shows that it is possible to devise MDPC codes with zero or very small error proba-
bility, and in the last case it comes at an affordable cost for cryptographic applications and this
by making assumptions that are corroborated by experimental evidence [Cha17]. There are ob-
viously several ways to improve our results. The first would be to use slightly more sophisticated
decoding techniques and/or more sophisticated analyses when we want a zero-error probability.
The maximum column intersection gives a lower bound on the expansion of the Tanner graph
and this can be used to study the bit-flipping algorithm considered in [SS96]. This would not
improve the lower-bound on the error-correction capacity however, but suggests that refined con-
siderations and decoding algorithms should be able to improve the error-correction capacity in
the worst case. Moreover, in order to simplify the analysis and the discussion we have considered
a very simple decoder. The probability of error can already be lowered rather significantly by
choosing in a slightly better way the threshold in Step 7 in Algorithm 1 and it is clear that more
sophisticated decoding techniques will be able to lower the probability of error significantly (see
[Cha17] for instance). This suggests that it should be possible to improve rather significantly
the parameters proposed in Table 1.
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A The Kullback-Leibler divergence
The proofs of the results proved in the appendix use the Kullback-Leibler divergence (see see for
instance [CT91]) and some of its properties what we now recall.
Definition 3. Kullback-Leibler divergence
Consider two discrete probability distributions p and q defined over a same discrete space X .
The Kullback-Leibler divergence between p and q is defined by
D(p||q) =
∑
x∈X
p(x) ln
p(x)
q(x)
.
We overload this notation by defining for two Bernoulli distributions B(p) and B(q) of respective
parameters p and q
D(p||q) def= D(B(p)||B(q)) = p ln
(
p
q
)
+ (1− p) ln
(
1− p
1− q
)
.
We use the convention (based on continuity arguments) that 0 ln 0p = 0 and p ln
p
0 =∞.
We will need the following approximations/results of the Kullback-Leibler divergence
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Lemma 4. For any δ ∈ (−1/2, 1/2) we have
D
(
1
2
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣12 + δ
)
= −1
2
ln(1− 4δ2). (7)
For constant α ∈ (0, 1) and δ going to 0 by staying positive, we have
D(α||δ) = −h(α)− α ln δ + O(δ). (8)
For 0 < y < x and x going to 0 we have
D(x||y) = x ln x
y
+ x− y +O (x2) . (9)
Proof. Let us first prove (7).
D
(
1
2
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣12 + δ
)
=
1
2
ln
1/2
1/2 + δ
+
1
2
ln
1/2
1/2− δ
P = −1
2
ln(1 + 2δ)− 1
2
ln(1− 2δ)
= −1
2
ln(1− 4δ2).
To prove (8) we observe that
D(α||δ) = α ln
(α
δ
)
+ (1− α) ln
(
1− α
1− δ
)
= −h(α)− α ln δ − (1 − α) ln(1 − δ)
= −h(α)− α ln δ +O(δ).
For the last estimate we proceed as follows
D(x||y) = x ln x
y
+ (1− x) ln 1− x
1− y
= x ln
x
y
− (1− x) (−x+ y +O (x2))
= x ln
x
y
+ x− y +O (x2) .
The Kullback-Leibler appears in the computation of large deviation exponents. In our case,
we will use the following estimate which is well known and which can be found for instance in
[BGT11]
Lemma 5. Let p be a real number in (0, 1) and X1, . . .Xn be n independent Bernoulli random
variables of parameter p. Then, as n tends to infinity:
P(X1 + . . .Xn ≥ τn) = (1− p)
√
τ
(τ − p)
√
2πn(1− τ)e
−nD(τ ||p)(1 + o(1)) for p < τ < 1, (10)
P(X1 + . . .Xn ≤ τn) = p
√
1− τ
(p− τ)√2πnτ e
−nD(τ ||p)(1 + o(1)) for 0 < τ < p. (11)
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B Proof of Lemma 2
Recall first this lemma.
Lemma 2. Assume that w = O (
√
n) and t = O (
√
n). Then
pb =
1
2
− (−1)bε
(
1
2
+O
(
1√
n
))
, (6)
where ε
def
= e−
2wt
n .
Before giving the proof of this lemma, observe P(V bij = 1) can be viewed as the probability
that the j-th parity check equation involving a bit i gives an incorrect information about bit i.
This is obtained through the following lemma.
Lemma 6. Consider a word h ∈ Fn2 of weight w and an error e ∈ Fn2 of weight t chosen
uniformly at random. Assume that both w and t are of order
√
n: w = O (
√
n) and t = O (
√
n).
We have
Pe(〈h, e〉 = 1) = 1
2
− 1
2
e−
2wt
n
(
1 +O
(
1√
n
))
.
Remark 1. Note that this probability is in this case of the same order as the probability taken over
errors e whose coordinates are drawn independently from a Bernoulli distribution of parameter
t/n. In such a case, from the piling-up lemma [Mat93] we have
Pe(〈h, e〉 = 1) =
1− (1− 2tn )w
2
=
1
2
− 1
2
ew ln(1−2t/n)
=
1
2
− 1
2
e−
2wt
n
(
1 +O
(
1√
n
))
.
The proof of this lemma will be done in the following subsection. Lemma 2 is a corollary of
this lemma since we have
pb = P(〈h, e〉 = 1|e1 = b). (12)
B.1 Proof of Lemma 6
The proof involves properties of the Krawtchouk polynomials. We recall that the (binary)
Krawtchouk polynomial of degree i and order n (which is an integer), Pni (X) is defined for
i ∈ {0, · · · , n} by:
Pni (X)
def
=
(−1)i
2i
i∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
X
j
)(
n−X
i− j
)
where
(
X
j
)
def
=
1
j!
X(X − 1) · · · (X − j + 1). (13)
Notice that it follows on the spot from the definition of a Krawtchouk polynomial that
Pnk (0) =
(−1)k(nk)
2k
. (14)
Let us define the bias δ by
δ
def
= 1− 2Pe(〈h, e〉 = 1).
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In other words Pe(〈h, e〉 = 1) = 12 (1− δ). These Krawtchouk polynomials are readily related to
δ. We first observe that
Pe(〈h, e〉 = 1) =
∑w
j=1
j odd
(
t
j
)(
n−t
w−j
)
(
n
w
) .
Moreover by observing that
∑w
j=0
(
t
j
)(
n−t
w−j
)
=
(
n
w
)
we can recast the following evaluation of a
Krawtchouk polynomial as
(−2)w(
n
w
) Pnw(t) =
∑w
j=0(−1)j
(
t
j
)(
n−t
w−j
)(
n
w
)
=
∑w
j=0
j even
(
t
j
)(
n−t
w−j
)−∑wj=1
j odd
(
t
j
)(
n−t
w−j
)
(
n
w
)
=
(
n
w
)− 2∑wj=1
j odd
(
t
j
)(
n−t
w−j
)
(
n
w
)
= 1− 2Pe(〈h, e〉 = 1)
= δ. (15)
To simplify notation we will drop the superscript n in the Krawtchouk polynomial notation. It
will be chosen as the length of the MDPC code when will use it in our case. An important lemma
that we will need is the following one.
Lemma 7. For all x in {1, . . . , t}, we have
Pw(x)
Pw(x− 1) =
(
1 +O
(
1
n
))
n− 2w +
√
(n− 2w)2 − 4w(n− w)
2(n− w) .
Proof. This follows essentially from arguments taken in the proof of [MS86][Lemma 36, §7, Ch.
17]. The result we use appears however more explicitly in [KL95][Sec. IV] where it is proved that
if x is in an interval of the form
[
0, (1− α)
(
n/2−
√
w(n − w)
)]
for some constant α ∈ [0, 1)
independent of x, n and w, then
Pw(x+ 1)
Pw(x)
=
(
1 +O
(
1
n
))
n− 2w +
√
(n− 2w)2 − 4w(n− w)
2(n− w) .
For our choice of t this condition is met for x and the lemma follows immediately.
We are ready now to prove Lemma 6.
Proof of Lemma 6. We start the proof by using (15) which says that
δ =
(−2)w(
n
w
) Pnw(t).
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We then observe that
(−2)w(
n
w
) Pnw(t) = (−2)w(n
w
) Pnw(t)
Pnw(t− 1)
Pnw(t− 1)
Pnw(t− 2)
. . .
Pnw(1)
Pnw(0)
Pnw (0)
=
(−2)w(
n
w
) ((1 +O( 1
n
))
n− 2w +
√
(n− 2w)2 − 4w(n− w)
2(n− w)
)t
Pnw(0) (by Lemma 7)
=
(
1 +O
(
1
n
))t(
n− 2w +
√
(n− 2w)2 − 4w(n− w)
2(n− w)
)t
(by (14))
= e
t ln
(
1−2ω+
√
(1−2ω)2−4ω(1−ω)
2(1−ω)
) (
1 +O
(
t
n
))
where ω
def
=
w
n
= e
t ln
(
1−2ω+1−4ω+O(ω2)
2(1−ω)
)(
1 +O
(
t
n
))
= e
t ln
(
1−3ω+O(ω2)
1−ω
)(
1 +O
(
t
n
))
= e
−2tω+O
(
tw2
n2
)(
1 +O
(
t
n
))
= e−
2wt
n
(
1 +O
(
1√
n
))
,
where we used at the last equation that t = O (
√
n) and w = O (
√
n).
C Proof of Lemma 3
Let us first recall this lemma.
Lemma 3. Under Assumption 1 used for an MDPC code of type (v, w) and when the error is
chosen uniformly at random among the errors of weight t, we have for all (b, i) ∈ {0}×{1, . . . , n−
t} ∪ {1} × {1, . . . , t},
P(Ebi = 1) = O
(
(1 − ε2)v/2√
vε
)
,
where ε
def
= e−
2wt
n .
Proof. For (b, i) ∈ {0}×{1, . . . , n− t}∪{1}×{1, . . . , t}, let Xi be independent Bernoulli random
variables of parameter pb. From Assumption 1 we have
P(E0i = 1) = q0 = P(
v∑
i=1
X0i > v/2)
P(E1i = 1) = q1 = P(
v∑
i=1
X1i ≤ v/2).
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By using Lemma 5 we obtain for q0
q0 ≤
(1− p0)
√
1
2
(12 − p0)
√
2πv(1− 12 )
e−vD(
1
2 ||p0)
≤ (1 − p0)
√
2√
πvε (1 +O (1/
√
n))
e−vD(
1
2 || 12− 12 ε(1+O(1/√n))) (16)
≤ (1 − p0)
√
2√
πvε (1 +O (1/
√
n))
e
v
(
ln(1−ε2)+O
(
1√
n
))
2 (17)
≤ O
(
(1− ε2)v/2√
vε
)
(18)
Whereas for q1 we also obtain
q1 ≤
p1
√
1
2
(p1 − 12 )
√
2πv 12
e−vD(
1
2 ||p1) (19)
≤ O
(
(1− ε2)v/2√
vε
)
(20)
D Proof of Theorem 1
We are ready now to prove Theorem 1. We first recall it.
Theorem 1. Under Assumption 1, we have for an MDPC code of type (v, w) where v = Θ(
√
n)
and w = Θ(
√
n):
P(S ≥ t′) ≤ 1√
t′
e
t′v
4 ln(1−ε2)+ t
′
8 ln(n)+O(t
′ ln(t′/t)),
where ε
def
= e−
2wt
n .
Proof.
P(S ≥ t′) ≤ P(S0 ≥ t′/2 ∪ S1 ≥ t′/2)
≤ P(S0 ≥ t′/2) + P(S1 ≥ t′/2)
By Assumption 1, S0 is the sum of n−t Bernoulli variables of parameter q0. By applying Lemma
5 we obtain
P(S0 ≥ t′/2) ≤
(1 − q0)
√
t′
2(n−t)
( t
′
2(n−t) − q0)
√
2π(n− t)(1− t′2(n−t) )
e
−(n−t)D
(
t′
2(n−t)
∣∣∣∣∣∣q0)
≤ O
(
1√
t′
e
−(n−t)D
(
t′
2(n−t)
∣∣∣∣∣∣q0)) (21)
We observe now that
D
(
t′
2(n− t)
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣q0
)
≥ D
(
t′
2(n− t)
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣O
(
(1 − ε2)v/2√
vε
))
(22)
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where we used the upper-bound on q0 coming from Lemma 3 and the fact that D(x||y) ≥ D(x||y′)
for 0 < y < y′ < x < 1. By using this and Lemma 4, we deduce
D
(
t′
2(n− t)
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣q0
)
≥ t
′
2(n− t) ln
(
t′
2(n− t)
)
− t
′
2(n− t) ln
(
O
(
(1− ε2)v/2
ε
√
v
))
+O
(
t′
2(n− t)
)
≥ t
′
2(n− t) ln
(
t′
√
v
n
)
− t
′v
4(n− t) ln
(
1− ε2)+O( t′
n
)
≥ t
′
2(n− t) ln
(
t
√
v
n
)
+
t′
2(n− t) ln(t
′/t)− t
′v
4(n− t) ln
(
1− ε2)+O( t′
n
)
≥ − t
′
8(n− t) lnn−
t′v
4(n− t) ln
(
1− ε2)+O( t′ ln(t′/t)
n
)
.
By plugging this expression in (21) we obtain
P(S0 ≥ t′/2) ≤ 1√
t′
e
t′v
4 ln(1−ε2)+ t
′
8 ln(n)+O(t
′ ln(t′/t))
On the other hand we have
P(S1 ≥ t′/2) ≤
(1 − q1)
√
t′
2t
( t
′
2t − q1)
√
2πt(1− t′2t )
e
−tD
(
t′
2t
∣∣∣∣∣∣q1)
≤ O
(
1√
t′
e
−tD
(
t′
2t
∣∣∣∣∣∣q1)) (23)
Similarly to what we did above, by using the upper-bound on q1 of Lemma 3 and D(x||y) ≥
D(x||y′) for 0 < y < y′ < x < 1, we deduce that
D
(
t′
2t
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣q1
)
≥ D
(
t′
2t
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣O
(
(1− ε2)v/2
ε
√
v
))
By using this together with Lemma 4 we obtain
D
(
t′
2t
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣q1
)
≥ −h(t′/2t)− t
′
2t
ln
(
O
(
(1− ε2)v/2
ε
√
v
))
+O
(
(1− 4ε2)v/2
ε
√
v
)
≥ − t
′v
4
ln
(
1− ε2)+ t′
8t
lnn+O
(
t′
t
ln(t′/t)
)
.
By using this lower-bound in (23), we deduce
P(S1 ≥ t′/2) ≤ 1√
t′
e
t′v
4 ln(1−ε2)+ t
′
8 ln(n)+O(t
′ ln(t′/t)).
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